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INSIDER TRADING ON THE CONTINENT
Klaus J. HOPT *
1. Introduction
Bob Mundheim has asked me to give you a 15 minute presentation on law
and practice with respect to insider trading on the Continent. I must confess
that I feel somewhat as if I were in Jules Verne's Around the World in 80 Days
- but only somewhat, because Europe in 15 minutes corresponds to "Around
the World in 80 Minutes". But, as this is the age of jets, I will try my best.
2. Three approaches to insider trading
I have prepared for you a short synoptic table [1] with condensed informa-
tion on Germany, France, and the European Economic Community [2]. I have
included Germany because of its very peculiar self-regulation system. As we
will see, it is a contractual self-regulation system of the stock exchanges, banks,
and industry - which is different from the admission rules, for example, of the
New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. France stands for
a fully-fledged legal system. It is characterized by rather serious penalties, a
central securities commission, and a slowly growing case law. A draft -amend-
ment to the French legislation on insider trading as of 1980 is supposed to
redefine "inside information" and "insider securities" and would extend the
scope of prohibition. The European Economic Community cannot be left out
because of its harmonization efforts.
There have been three steps in the EEC endeavor. The first is an insider
provision in the 1970/1975 draft regulation concerning a Statute for European
Companies [3]. This would apply to a truly European company: mainly
multinational enterprises and their joint ventures, somewhat similar to an
American federal company. The draft regulation has run into political difficul-
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ties, however, primarily because of labor codetermination, which the Germans
do not want to give up but which many of our neighbors do not want in its
far-reaching German version. As for the proposed insider provision of the
draft, one should not regret its sorry fate. It is shaped after the example of the
American section 16 of the 1934 Act and it includes only company insiders.
The second step is the European Code of Conduct relating to transactions
in transferable securities which the EC Commission recommended to the
member states in 1977. This Code contains basic principles of fair trading in
securities. One general principle is the equality of treatment for all holders of
securities of the same type issued by the same company. Several supplementary
principles are directed against the improper use of price-sensitive information.
In its explanatory memorandum to the European Code of Conduct, the EC
Commission conceded that harmonization by legally binding directives is "the
only [method] capable of attaining the objective of true European integration".
Since July 1979, a Working Party, with delegates from the EC Commission and
from the ministries, stock exchanges, and certain supervisory agencies of the
various member states, has been making good progress in preparing such a
directive on insider trading.
3. Other approaches in Europe
My choice of Germany, France, and the EEC is, of course, too narrow.
Here, as on most occasions, Europe speaks with many voices. Quite often
smaller countries, like Belgium or the Scandinavian countries, come up with
very interesting legal experiments. At this point it is enough to state that there
are many countries in Europe with a record of both insider trading and insider
rules. In Switzerland, for example, 10 years ago profit from insider trading was
not only considered to be quite all right, but it was sometimes openly justified
as part of management remuneration (i.e. the Manne theory in practice).
Recently, however, in Zurich there have been efforts to outlaw insider trading
by more than mere self-regulation. Denmark has its insider rules in the Danish
corporation law of 1973, with a company register solution that resembles the
one in English company law. In Belgium, the specific institutional set-up and
the established authority of the Banking Commission have helped to prevent
insider trading for many years without any legal text. Nevertheless, in 1979 the
government introduced a draft law on insider trading. It is a penalty-type
solution and will be inserted into the company law. The draft law contains a
most interesting international law provision, which I will mention later. Italy's
insider rules are contained in the law of 1974. Having lived and taught at the
European University Institute in Florence for two years, I am somewhat
sceptical about analyzing these rules word by word. Rather, the interesting
problem is the intricate connection among private industry, public enterprise,
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and party politics. These are the sources of Italian law in action, which is very
difficult to grasp from the outside. The CONSOB, a kind of Italian mini-SEC
created by the 1974 law, has been generally known for its inefficiency. Yet this
may very well change under its newly appointed president, who is a well-known
corporate lawyer from Milan with long experience and international exposure.
4. Four fundamental questions
Since the details of the German, French, and European solutions are in the
synoptic table, I will not dwell on them here. I would rather raise four
fundamental questions with respect to insider regulation from a European
point of view.
First, there is a striking difference between the German and the French
solution. In a nutshell this is self-regulation versus regulation through law.
Unlike Americans, many Europeans conceive this to be a true alternative: not
just the question you have faced once more in your Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975 - namely, where to draw the best line between self-regulation
and regulation by the SEC and the courts. The German way of insider
regulation is contractual self-regulation of the stock exchanges, banks, and
industry. The insiders of the stock corporations and banks agree by contract to
respect the Insider Trading Guidelines of 1976 [4] and to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Insider Trading Inquiries Commissions at the various stock
exchanges. As a matter of practice, by 1980 nearly 100% of the German banks
and around 95% of the stock corporations (counted on the basis of stated
capital) are bound by these insider guidelines. Since the first version of the
guidelines in 1970, many inquiries by the Inquiries Commissions have taken
place. For example, in the Thyssen-Rheinstahl case, a friendly takeover in
1973, 172 single inquiry proceedings have been carried out - with negative
results.
The evaluation of the German experience is quite controversial [5]. Since its
very beginning, I have been an outspoken critic of the German solution for
several reasons. First, an insider regulation should cover all insiders concerned.
In Germany this is not the case. If counted not on the basis of stated capital,
but on the basis of the number of companies at the stock exchange, only
slightly above 509o of the stock corporations are bound. For free investment
advisers (i.e. the non-banking sector), the percentage is even much smaller.
Secondly, the guidelines do not go far enough. While this could be shown at
several points (for example the definition of insider), it is most serious with
respect to the securities covered. Only transactions in shares admitted to the
official or semi-official stock exchanges are affected. This means that insider
trading in the shares of more than three-quarters of the 2,000 odd German
stock corporations remains permissible, since only the shares of some 470 stock
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corporations are admitted to the stock exchange. Thirdly, the contractual
sanctions are mild. The insider risks only bearing the costs of the proceedings
and paying back his profit to the company. The risk of publicity is small. As a
general principle, even a clear conviction may not be rendered public by the
Inquiries Commission. Only in case of a gross violation and upon the unani-
mous decision of the Commission (and, in practice, after a proceeding before
the courts) may there be an exception.
This is one side of the story. On the other side, practitioners involved in the
self-regulatory process are convinced of the efficacy of the system. Judge
Kissel, for example, who was presiding judge of the Inquiries Commission at
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and who is now presiding judge of the Bundes-
arbeitsgericht (the highest German labor court), has warned in a public
statement of December 1980 not to turn the matter over to the courts.
Currently, in case of inquiries everyone cooperates voluntarily. This is true
even for Mr. Vetter and other trade union members on the boards of
co-determined stock corporations, who, as a matter of principle, are against
insider self-regulation. Judge Kissel fears that enforcement of an insider law by
a state agency or by the courts would be utterly inefficient, just like prosecu-
tion of white-collar criminality in general. However that may be, of all inquiry
proceedings under the German guidelines since 1970, none has ended with
publicly known conviction - quite in contrast, for example, to France, where
in the last seven years 26 people were accused, 16 were adjudged, and all but
one found quilty, with actual fines imposed ranging from 5,000 to 50,000
francs and prison terms from two to ten months (although only on probation).
Other cases are still pending.
The second key issue is timely disclosure. The inverted relationship between
insider dealing and early disclosure is generally seen in Europe. But up to now
there is no established body of rules making disclosure obligatory or even
providing for liability in case of non-disclosure. The EEC directive on the
conditions for admission of securities to official trading on a stock exchange
has only very recently stated a very general principle in this respect:
The company must inform the public without delay of major new developments in its sphere of
activity which are not public knowledge and which may. by virtue of their effect on its assets and
financial position or on the general progress of its business, lead to large movements in the prices
of its shares [6].
Furthermore, it is still far from being settled under what circumstances
inside information may be disclosed, or even must be disclosed, under overrid-
ing legal rights or duties. This is true for the labor union members on
co-determined company boards. It is also true for banks giving investment
advice. The rationale of Cady, Roberts is not necessarily valid for those
European countries with mere self-regulation of insider trading and with a
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universal banking system. These universal banks participate in the companies:
they are represented on the company boards, they exercise a depository vote
for shareholder-clients, and they do all kinds of banking business with the
company. Of course, they use all their information for their own credit
business. What if such a bank knows that the company will very soon become
bankrupt, that company insider dealing is going on, or that the stock prices are
manipulated? Can the bank still do business both with the company and with
the small investor without warning the latter? There is a growing opinion in
German legal literature that in such cases, legal duties of warning and investor
protection cannot be done away with by mere self-regulation [7].
The third key issue, which I can mention only briefly, is the problem of
costs. In the stiff economic environment that we face in Europe today, there is
not sympathy for big, new regulatory agencies. Quite the contrary, distrust of
state administration and the plea for deregulation are becoming strong. For
this reason alone, aside from several others, today in Germany a Securities and
Exchange Commission is politically just not feasible; and this is even more true
on the EEC level. At least as important is the question of priorities in
corporate and capital market law reforms. In Germany the stock market is
weak, the number of new stock corporations is virtually nil, and there is little
incentive to go public and to have the shares of the company traded on the
stock exchange. This problem of revitalizing the stock market is, of course,
much more urgent and more fundamental than insider trading and a new
commission. Furthermore, there are the possible side-effects of fully-fledged
insider regulation. Even under the mild German version, since the introduction
of the insider regulation the share ownership of board members in their own
companies has clearly decreased. While there is no proof of a general causal
relationship, the fact itself is unwelcome and even alarming.
Finally, there is the problem of the internationalization of securities transac-
tions and also of insider trading. The French, English, and Belgian securities
commissions have been confronted with this problem repeatedly. Since na-
tional law ends at the state frontiers - which unlike in the U.S. are very close -
the commissions have tried to solve the problem on practical terms, but
without too much success. One road to take in this dilemma is the harmoniza-
tion of insider regulation as planned in the European Communities. Then, at
least all over the ten member states, the problem would lose much of its
acuteness. However, even then there would still be the problem of Swiss bank
accounts (our Swiss friend Alain Hirsch is asked to forgive).
Another answer may be the expansion of national insider rules to their
utmost extent. Belgium is about to try this. In the new draft law of 1979 there
is a provision that obliges the Belgain intermediary acting for a person
established abroad to disclose the identity of the latter in case of presumptive
evidence of insider trading. In the event of a refusal, the court may prohibit,
for a period of between one and ten years, execution in Belgium of any order
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conveyed to the intermediary acting for the person established abroad. Such a
conviction would be made public in the Official Gazette and in at least two
daily newspapers. The effect of such publication would be that everyone in the
Belgian securities business would be forbidden from taking part in the execu-
tion of such orders. This opens up interesting international perspectives, even
though there are quite serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the Belgian
solution.
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